Tawḥīd Reconfigured as Sovereignty (Ḥākimiyya)
Tawḥīd Reconfigured as Sovereignty (Ḥākimiyya)
In the thought of Sayyid Qutb, tawḥīd (the oneness of God) is rearticulated as a claim about sovereignty (ḥākimiyya), that is, the exclusive right of God to legislate, command, and determine the moral and social order. While classical Islamic theology affirmed God as the ultimate source of law, Qutb sharpened this affirmation into a central diagnostic principle for evaluating modern societies. In his account, the defining religious question is not merely whom one worships ritually, but who is obeyed as the final authority in matters of value, law, and collective life.
Qutb’s formulation draws on, and radicalises, earlier twentieth-century Islamist thought, particularly that of Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī. However, Qutb presses the logic of divine sovereignty further, treating “man-made” legislation not as a correctable imperfection within an Islamic order, but as a structural usurpation of a divine prerogative. Where human beings claim autonomous authority to legislate independently of God’s guidance, Qutb argues, they effectively elevate themselves into rivals of God. In this sense, ḥākimiyya becomes a corollary of tawḥīd: to affirm God’s oneness is to deny ultimate authority to any human institution or sovereign.
This move has significant conceptual consequences. Qutb extends the notion of jāhiliyya—classically referring to pre-Islamic ignorance—to modern societies, including nominally Muslim ones, insofar as they normalise human sovereignty. Political systems grounded in secular law are thus read not simply as religiously neutral, but as embodying a form of idolatry, since they relocate obedience and norm-setting from God to human agents. Conversely, submission to God’s sovereignty is presented as the basis of genuine human freedom, freeing individuals from domination by other humans.
In Qutb’s later writings, particularly Milestones, this understanding of ḥākimiyya underpins a broader programme of Islamic renewal. Because society as a whole is judged to be structured by illegitimate authority, reform cannot be achieved merely through personal piety or incremental legal change. Instead, Qutb envisages the formation of a morally disciplined vanguard that embodies Qur’anic principles and works to re-establish a social order grounded in divine guidance. Here, tawḥīd functions not only as a theological doctrine, but as a principle organising ethics, politics, and communal life.
Qutb’s reconfiguration of tawḥīd as sovereignty has proven highly influential, shaping subsequent Islamist discourse and placing questions of political authority at the centre of modern Islamic self-understanding. At the same time, it has generated sustained internal critique from Muslim scholars who accept God’s ultimate authority while rejecting Qutb’s stark polarity between divine rule and human legislation. In this sense, ḥākimiyya marks not a settled doctrine, but a decisive reorientation of debate within contemporary Islamic thought.